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 Las empresas familiares tienen niveles de deuda más altos en 
comparación con las empresas no familiares. Este hecho corrobora la 
corriente de la literatura financiera de defensa de este comportamiento. 
El vencimiento de la deuda influye en este resultado. Las empresas 
familiares tienen niveles más bajos de deuda a largo plazo. En el 
ámbito de las fuentes, las empresas familiares más pequeñas tienen 
una mayor utilización de fundo de los socios y de la deuda de 
proveedores de bienes de equipos, en particular, las empresas de 
primera generación. Las segundas generaciones tienen niveles de 
deuda más bajos. Las empresas familiares más grandes tienen una 
menor frecuencia de deuda nula a largo plazo comparativamente a las 
empresas no familiares y una relación negativa entre el tamaño y la 
deuda nula, pero en el caso de las microempresas, este hecho es al 
revés. Los valores nulos de la deuda son pertinentes. Estos resultados 
se mantienen en la situación específica de la deuda bancaria. Modelos 
revelan algunas diferencias entre los determinantes de la utilización de 
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 Family firms have higher levels of debt than non-family firms 
corroborating the financial theory forecasting this behavior. The 
maturity of debt affects this result. In long-term debt family firms 
show lower levels than non-family firms. As for financing sources, 
smaller family firms make more use of owners’ funds and equipment 
suppliers' credit to finance their needs, particularly first-generation 
firms. The second generation has a lower level of debt than the first. 
Larger family firms have a lower frequency of zero long-term ratios 
than their non-family counterparts and a negative relationship between 
size and zero debt ratio, but in the case of micro firms, this is reversed. 
Zero debt ratios are relevant in the sample. These results hold true in 
the specific situation of bank debt. The models revealed some 
differences between the determinants of the use of debt and those 
determining its proportion. 
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Family firms are of great importance in the 
global economy due to their influence in the 
creation of employment and wealth in a 
considerable number of countries (Schulz et al, 
2001). In many, they account for around two 
thirds of private economic entities. In Western 
Europe, family firms represent between 75% 
and 95% of registered firms (Lank, 1995). The 
majority of new firms created are family-owned 
(Westhead and Howorth, 2007). Their survival 
and development has a great impact on the 
progress of local economies and social 
cohesion. According to Neubauer and Lank 
(1998), these firms have the greatest impact on 
economic growth, as producers, employers and 
innovators.  
Assessment of business structure reveals the 
relevant role of family firms in the economies of 
most countries. However, the financial literature 
shows a gap regarding theoretical and empirical 
contributions that clarify how the family-
ownership factor and its specificities determine 
the decision process, and specifically that of 
financing. Nevertheless, ownership and/or firm 
control has been mentioned in the literature as a 
determinant of the financing decision process 
(La Porta et al, 1999; Friend and Lang, 1988; 
Brailsford et al, 2002). Particularly, study of the 
decision process of family firms has emerged as 
a subject of research but there is still a great 
need to clarify how this decision is made in this 
type of firm (López-Gracia and Sánchez-
Andújar, 2007; Blanco-Mazagatos et al, 2007; 
Gallo et al, 2004).  
In the business world, family firms have a 
variety of unique characteristics that distinguish 
them from others. Among them stands out the 
relationship between the family and operations, 
specifically the overlapping roles of being a 
family member and an element of firm 
management. Personalization of the family 
business is carried over to business relationships 
(with clients, suppliers, creditors and others) 
(Harvey and Evans, 1995). The overlapping of 
family and business activity can create 
particular attitudes in relation to financing 
strategy (López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar, 
2007).  
Alcorn (1982) identifies three stages in 
family firms: the undertaking, maturity and 
succession. In the first, efforts are directed to 
building a solid economic base for the firm. 
Managing growth and ensuring financial 
viability are critical tasks. In this phase, the 
owner is more inclined to take risks. The need 
for security, in personal and business life, 
occurs in the period of maturity. This phase 
requires greater competences by the owner in 
managing the interests of the different 
stakeholders. Finally, in the third stage, the 
concern about succession emerges. Ward (1988, 
1991) also presents a three-stage model of 
family firm development, based on age and the 
characteristics of two generations of family 
members: initial (0-5 years), intermediate (10-
20 years) and final (20-30 years).  
Handing over or transferring the business to 
the next generations is a determinant of the 
financing decision, and possibly a 
differentiating one in the process. Sonfield and 
Lussier (2004), in their study of the choice of 
financing sources, found that 61% of first-
generation firms resorted more to financing 
through equity rather than debt. In second-
generation firms, the figure only reaches 11%, 
being 33% in the third generation. These results 
indicate use of lower levels of debt by the first 
generation than the following ones. Of these, the 
second generation greatly increases the firm's 
level of debt. The third generation adopts a 
more modest level of debt than the second. 
Greater use of equity by first-generation firms 
(less debt) was also found by Bork et al (1996) 
and Gersick et al (1996). In the case of third-
generation firms compared to second-generation 
ones, Cole and Wolken (1995) and Coleman 
and Carsky (1999) corroborate this behaviour. 
According to the study by Dyer (2003), around 
4/5 of first-generation firms have a 'father-
figure' management style and culture1 and in the 
following generations, 2/3 are found to adopt a 
more professional style of management. Ward 
                                                 
1 According to the author, 'father-figure' management is characterized by 
a hierarchy of relationships, control and authority from top management 
downwards, close supervision and mistrust of outside bodies. 
Professional management involves the inclusion, and sometimes 
predominance, of non-family managers in the firm. 
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(1987), quoted by Romano et al (2000), 
highlights the fact that family firms typically 
reinvest most, or even all, their funds in the 
initial stages of their life-cycle. In the following 
stages, owners tend to use more firms' results as 
a consequence of the family's growing desire for 
better financial well-being. The matter of 
succession in firm management is also relevant 
in distinguishing family and non-family firms. 
In the latter, that succession is analyzed and 
assessed in advance. In the former, precisely the 
opposite may occur (Dreux, 1990). Coleman 
and Carsky (1999), quoting De Visscher et al 
(1995), highlight the fact of financing being one 
of the main challenges for family firms and the 
major cause of their failure is insufficient capital 
and liquidity. Tranferring ownership can 
exacerbate this problem as the following 
generations may have different business and 
financial objectives from the founders. Around 
2/3 of first-generation family firms do not 
survive the second generation (Gersick et al, 
1996). 
The influence of the size factor on firms' 
financing decision process is not clarified. The 
majority of previous empirical studies focus on 
SMEs as a uniform group, ignoring the fact that 
different factors can affect the financing 
decision of different sizes in considerably 
different ways (Ramalho and Silva, 2009). In 
those studies, it is also common to compare that 
group with large or small firms (Ebben and 
Johnson, 2006; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall 
et al, 2000; López-Gracia and Aybar-Arias, 
2000; Chittenden et al, 1996, among others). In 
this respect, there is a lack of research into the 
financing process distinguishing different size 
categories, particularly among smaller firms. 
That lack is especially evident in the study of 
the financing decision of micro and small firms 
separately, except for the studies by Ramalho 
and Silva (2009), Akyüz et al (2006), Cassar 
and Holmes (2003) and López-Gracia and 
Aybar-Arias (2000). 
Besides evaluating the factors of ownership, 
generation and size, greater clarification of 
firms' financing decision process will be 
reached taking into consideration that this is 
developed in two distinct stages. The first, in 
which firm leaders decide whether or not to use 
debt, and the second, if the decision is to use it, 
determining the proportion. This approach to 
studying the financing decision considering the 
two moments or phases of the decision is the 
result of the recent conclusions presented by 
Cassar (2004), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), 
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006), Strebulaev and 
Yang (2006) and Ramalho and Silva (2009) on 
the existence of a relevant number of firms 
without, or with low amounts of financial debt, 
indicating firms' option not to resort to this 
source of finance. “…firms have the opportunity 
to increase their leverage and are choosing to 
leave money on the table.” (Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006:46). 
 
2.. Determinants of the Financing Decision in 
the Financial Literature 
 
2.1. Capital Structure Theories 
According to the financial literature, it was 
the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM) 
that gave rise to a vast amount of theoretical and 
empirical literature on the subject of the 
determinants of firms' capital structure. These 
authors opposed the classical theory defending 
the existence of an optimal capital structure that 
maximizes firm value through reducing the 
average cost considered of firms' capital. MM 
introduced the irrelevance of firms' capital 
structure2 for their value. This depends only on 
the level and risk of future cash flow created by 
real assets, making the financing decision 
irrelevant. 
Static trade-off theory once again introduces 
the existence of an optimal capital structure that 
allows maximization of the firm's value through 
the benefits and costs associated with each 
source of finance (such as bankruptcy costs, 
costs associated with obtaining from each 
source, tax benefits and others).  
The appearance of the fiscal line of thought 
came to highlight the differences in taxation 
                                                 
2 On the assumption of the perfect capital market, non-existence of tax 
and transaction costs.  
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attributed to the various sources of finance. This 
factor led MM (1963) to change their original 
position, stating that taxation of firms' results 
and tax deduction on the cost of outside capital 
could allow firms' value to increase. Miller 
(1977) concludes that the existence of different 
agents with differentiated rates of tax leads to 
firms issuing different bonds in the financing 
decision. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
introduced the fact of other sources of tax 
benefits being able to reduce the appeal of 
external capital as a function of these benefits. 
Another theory introduces the matter of 
agency relationships and the financing decision. 
According to Agency Theory, the interests of 
the principal and the agent do not coincide and 
in the absence of a suitable incentive and 
monitoring system, the agent will act in order to 
maximize his utility (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In business finance, this theory has been 
applied to studying the relationships between 
firm managers and shareholders/owners. 
Therefore, in this approach, it is argued that 
while firm owners aim to maximize profit, their 
agents (managers) may prefer to undertake 
activities in their own interests which do not 
maximize profit. In this way, firm performance 
depends to some extent on owners' efficiency in 
controlling and monitoring their agents 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). The costs of 
these control and monitoring activities are 
agency costs (Smith, 2008). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue the conflicts that may 
exist between shareholders, managers and 
creditors and the problem of asset substitution 
originate agency costs and influence 
determination of firms' capital structure. The 
same authors say that financing through external 
capital can discipline managers' behaviour. 
Derived from agency costs, Myers (1977) points 
out that the type of assets can determine the type 
of finance.  
The importance of the bankruptcy issue, the 
respective costs for firms and their influence on 
their governance led to introduction of the 
bankruptcy costs approach, as proposed by 
Kraus and Lintzenberger (1973). For the 
authors, the value of an indebted firm would be 
equal to a firm with no debt plus the value of the 
debt, less bankruptcy costs. More debt increases 
the firm's exposure to possible difficulties in 
meeting its commitments, i.e., increasing the 
expected bankruptcy costs. 
The theory based on information asymmetry 
is formed of two lines of thought: pecking order 
and signaling. The former defends that firms do 
not have an optimal debt ratio and the financing 
decision is based on the problem of information 
between the firm's external and internal agents. 
Therefore, those in charge of firms prefer to 
finance themselves firstly through self-financing 
and if these funds are not sufficient, they then 
turn to risk-free debt, followed by risky debt and 
finally issuing equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
the latter approach was stimulated by Ross 
(1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). The first 
author argues that investors interpret high levels 
of debt as a sign of the firm's high quality and 
that profitability and debt are positively related. 
The others, on the contrary, argue that a 
business-person with a new investment project 
can indicate its quality through the proportion of 
equity used to finance it. The value will increase 
with the increase in the owners' shares. 
Another approach introduced is the theory 
based on corporate control. “Following the 
growing importance of takeover activities in the 
1980s, the finance literature began to examine 
the linkage between the market for corporate 
control and capital structure.” (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991:319). La Porta et al (1999) refer to 
the excessive control of cash flow rights arising 
from the strong presence of the owners in firm 
management. Their characteristics (families, 
financing bodies) determine the financing 
decision. The concentration or dispersion of 
ownership is a determinant of the financing 
decision (La Porta et al, 1999 and Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Firms that are an attractive 
target for acquisition offers will tend to increase 
their levels of debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Harris and Raviv, 1988). 
 
3..Methodologies and Hypotheses 
 
3.1.Methodologies 
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This study resorts to the two-part fractional 
regression model so as to test and identify, 
separately, the determinants of the use and 
proportion of debt. An aspect emerging from 
empirical studies about the financial decision, 
and relevant for the decision on the functional 
form to apply, is separating analysis of the 
factors determining the decision to use debt 
from the factors determining its proportion 
(Cassar, 2004; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; 
Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2006; Strebulaev and 
Yang, 2006). In this connection, the Two-Part 
Fractional Regression Model presented by 
Ramalho and Silva (2007) emerges. According 
to the authors,this model plays an important part 
in studying firms' financing decision because it 
includes the advantages of the fractional 
regression model (according to Ramalho and 
Silva, this econometric model is appropriate for 
the characteristics of the subject of study – 
explaining the behaviour of a dependent 
variable with values between 0 and 1), adding 
the possibility of this functional form allowing 
separate analysis of the factors determining the 
decision on debt compared to those determining 
its proportion. This is specified in two parts: the 
first is a binary model explaining the probability 




Where θ corresponds to the vector of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables and 
F(.) is the function of the logistic or normal 
distribution. Resulting from this form, in the 
Logit and Probit model, respectively, they can 
be estimated through the maximum likelihood 
method. The second part of the model considers 
study of the determinants of the amount of debt 
to be issued by firms with debt ratios above 
zero. In this study, we chose to apply the 
fractional regression model previously referred 
to, applied only to the sample of firms 




Four hypotheses are identified directly 
related to the central aims of this research work: 
Hypothesis 1: “Family Firms present a 
different financial structure from their non-
family counterparts due to a process decision 
determined by different factors.” - The decision 
process of both family and non-family firms 
involves a set of common and different aspects 
and factors, as seen in the previous chapters. 
And given the matter of the attitude towards 
financial risk, ownership and other aspects, a 
different financial structure is expected between 
family and non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 2: “Family firms of the second 
and subsequent generations present a different 
financial structure from that of first generation 
firms.” - The financial literature attributes great 
importance to the matter of the generation in the 
way firms develop their decision process and 
governance, particularly in the case of family 
firms. The second and subsequent generations 
tend to adopt a different attitude from the first 
regarding matters such as risk, ownership and 
management. 
Hypothesis 3: “The size factor has a 
fundamental role in the financing decision 
process, differentiating the financial structure of 
micro, small and medium-sized/large firms”. 
The size factor has been widely referred to in 
the financial literature as a determinant of the 
financing decision. Firms of different sizes 
present different problems of information 
asymmetry, agency problems and others which 
determine their access to certain sources of 
finance. It is therefore important to analyze how 
this factor behaves in distinguishing between 
family and non-family firms and the respective 
decision process. 
Hypothesis 4: “Family firms present 
differences between the factors determining the 
use of debt and those determining its 
proportion. There are also differences in these 
factors between family and non-family firms.” - 
The work by Ramalho and Silva (2009) and 
Cassar (2004), concerning clarification of the 
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determinants of firms' capital structure, 
mentions the need to develop study of the 
financing decision in two phases or moments. 
The first phase consists of the decision to use, or 
not to use, a given source. After choosing that 
source, it is necessary to decide on the amount 
or proportion. The former authors state that the 
determinants of the financing decision at the 
first stage will not necessarily be the same as 
those determining the second stage, and 
therefore do not imply action in the same 
direction. It is therefore important to analyze 
this aspect in family and non-family firms. 
Table 1 
Determinants of capital structure. 
Factor Measure Relationship with Debt 
Age Number of Years 
between the firm's 
foundation and the 
sample period 
A significant relationship between firm age and level of debt – this variable has been used as a determinant of 
the capital structure decision and can represent two opposing sign effects. If the variable is used to represent the 
firm's reputation, a positive sign is expected with debt. A more mature firm, presenting greater fame and 
recognition by the financial market, has easier access. This maturity can also mean a past of accumulating internally 
generated funds (through a history of positive results) and in this case, a negative relationship with debt is expected, 
due to greater accumulation of funding meaning less need for debt. In the case of family firms, the doubt 
concerning the duality of the sign of the relationship is strengthened, given the various arguments pointed out in the 
financial literature on debt in these firms. The approach defending less debt in family firms justifies that hypothesis 
with their leaders' aversion to financial risk, mainly in founders or the first generation. But that aversion tends to 
diminish in subsequent generationsas. 
Size Natural Logarithm 
of Turnover 
A positive relationship with debt – Access to the financial and capital market is fundamental in firms' financing 
decision process, meaning a greater number of possible sources of finance. The size factor and access to the market 
are closely related. Larger firms have easier access due to fewer problems of information asymmetry, moral and 
financial hazard, as explained in the previous sections. 
Profitabil
ity 
Ratio of EBIT to 
Total Assets 
A negative relationship with debt – Firm leaders' preference for the use of internally generated funds in the 
financing decision is widespread in the financial literature. The theory of pecking order of financing sources 
assumes internal funds to be the first preference. In family firms, this preference is extremely relevant given firm 
owners' aversion to financial risk and opening up capital. A negative relationship is therefore expected, since 
greater profitability implies greater capacity to generate internal funds and less need to resort to external funding. 
Tangible 
Assets 
Ratio of Fixed 
Assets to Total 
Assets 
A positive relationship with debt – In financing through external funding, a firm's capacity to present assets with 
collateral value, which can be used as a guarantee in the case of failing to meet commitments related to those 
external funds, is a relevant aspect in easing access to the financial market. Therefore, a greater volume of tangible 
assets, and therefore more collateral value, is expected to mean a positive relationship with debt 
Average 
Tax Rate 
Ratio of Tax on 
Income to Results 
Before Tax 
A positive relationship with debt - Haugen and Senbet (1988) state that a positive relationship is expected 
between the tax rate on income and debt, because the interest that can be deducted, for firms with a high rate of tax, 
makes it an incentive to using more debt. The costs of finance through outside capital can be deducted in 
determining the amount to be taxed, implying more tax benefits through this source of finance. Increased tax rates 
lead to increasing the value of those benefits. 
R&D Ratio of R&D to 
Total Net Assets 
A negative relationship with debt - Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) highlight the specific nature of assets as a source 
of problems in terms of financing, due to the characteristics of not reusing these assets. The agency costs associated 








Total Net Assets 
A negtive relationship with debt – According to the arguments of Titman and Wessels (1988), the tax reduction 
on amortization and tax credits for investment are substitutes for the tax benefits obtained through financing with 
external capital. Consequently, it is expected that firms with high tax benefits unrelated to debt in relation to their 
cash flow expectations, will include less debt in their capital structure. 
Liquidity Ratio of 
Avaliabilities to 
Total Net Assets. 
 
A negative relationship with debt. - According to Antoniou et al (2006), firms with sufficient liquid assets do not 
need to increase debt, and low debt can consequently be expected. This situation is related to the theory of  pecking 
order, according to which managers prefer self-financing. Therefore, they will seek to create reserves from the 
results obtained to finance future investment. Manos et al (2001) present a positive relationship between this 
variable and level of debt because demonstration of firms' ability to meet their commitments increases their 
capacity for debt.  
Growth Annual Growth 
Rate of Assets 
[(Assets year n – 
Assets year n-1) / 
Assets year n-1] -
1 
A positive relationship with debt – Firm growth is associated with greater needs for funding to finance that 
development. Thies and Klock (1992) identified a positive relationship between growth and level of debt. Firms at a 
stage of growth do not have sufficient internal funds to finance it, and seek debt to avoid the issue/transaction costs 
of equity. Firm growth, among other things, is the consequence of increased investment and this needs to be 
financed. With internal funds being insufficient to cover needs, firms have to turn to other sources. In this case, they 




Need for Working 
Capital =[(Stocks 
+ Clients) – 
(Suppliers + 
State)]/Assets. 
A positive relationship with debt - Together with investment in tangible assets, financing working capital needs is 
one of the concerns related to the financing decision. The financial literature states that keeping a balanced financial 
structure involves financing the needs of  extra permanent exploration considering the permanent exploration 
resources available with permanent capital. Therefore, firms with higher levels of these needs are expected to 







Titman and Wessels (1988) establish a relationship between industry type and debt, with a negative relationship 
between the degree of firm specialization and its level of debt. The category of industry is a potential determinant of 
capital structure because firms in the same industry face similar market conditions and have similar risk 
characteristics (Brailsford, 1999). The specific nature of the activity carried out influences debt by determining 
various factors related to firms.  
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According to the contributions of capital 
structure theories relating to the determinants of 
capital structure, the control variables are 
included in table 1. 
 
4. Sample and Descriptive Analysis 
 
4.1.Sample 
Classification of family and non-family firms 
in this study, as in the work by López-Gracia 
and Sánchez-Andújar (2007) Blanco-Mazagatos 
et al (2007) and Ménendez-Requejo (2006), is 
guided by the information supplied by the 
database used – SABI – Analysis System of 
Iberian Balance Sheets, managed by the firms of 
Coface, Informa and BvD. This does not 
guarantee complete information about family 
members' participation in firm management. 
Despite this limitation, the informative capacity 
of this database is recognized, and it was 
decided to follow the methodology adopted by 
these authors in selecting the sample classified 
as family firms. Firms where individuals or the 
family hold 51% or more of capital were 
classified as family firms.  
Firms that did not comply with Article 35 of 
the Code of Commercial Societies (equity less 
than 50% of share capital), that did not indicate 
the number of employees in 2007, and without 
operational gains and sales, were excluded from 
the years of the period of analysis. Applying 
these criteria resulted in a sample of 13.527 
family firms and 2.377 non-family firms for the 
year 2007. Besides the family ownership factor, 
this study aims to clarify how the size factor 
determines the financing decision. Therefore, 
the samples representing family and non-family 
firms will be divided in three groups according 
to size: micro, small, medium-sized/large. The 
methodology used to classify firms in the three 
size categories was that presented in the 
European Commission Recommendation of 6 
May 2003 (nº 2003/361/CE). The main criterion 
was therefore the number of employees, 
complemented by a financial criterion (total 
assets or turnover), as mentioned in Point 4 and 




The financial literature recognizes the 
importance of the generation factor in firms' 
governance. Handing over the firm to the next 
generation produces effects on the financing 
decision. Specifically referred to is less aversion 
to debt and to opening up capital in the second 
and subsequent generations. Table 1 reveals less 
debt in firms of the second and subsequent 
generations in both family and non-family 
firms. The former continue to present higher 
levels of debt but in the second generation the 
two types of firm come closer in terms of total 
debt. This reduction in debt after the first 
generation was also found by Menéndez-
Requejo (2006) and Blanco-Mazagatos et al 
(2007). This development may be due to second 
generation firms being able to register a past of 
accumulated results and/or being at a more 
advanced stage of their life-cycle. Therefore, 
they need to make less investment with less 
need for external funding.  
Table 2 
Financing Structure by Generation. 
  1st Generation: < 25 Years 2nd Generation and Follows: ≥ 25 Years 
Mean Mean 
Debt  
Fam. No Fam. 
T Test  Mann-Whitney Fam. No Fam. 
T Test  Mann-Whitney 
Total 0,548 0,517 5.01*** 5.59*** 0,458 0,447 1.28* 1,42 
Long-term 0,092 0,097 -1,18 -2.13** 0,086 0,092 -1,16 -3.09*** 
Short-term 0,456 0,420 5.92*** 6.06*** 0,371 0,355 2.18** 2.02** 
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Table 3 shows very similar behaviour in 
terms of weight of total bank debt between the 
first generation of family and non-family firms. 
The differences between the two types of firm 
are in the level of maturity of this source of 
finance. Non-family firms present a greater 
proportion of medium and long-term bank debt, 
with the situation being inverted in the case of 
short-term debt. In the second generation, only 
non-family firms show an increase in this source 
of finance (mainly short-term). Family firms 
show a slight increase in long-term debt and a 
smaller proportion of short-term debt. In 
relation to financing by owners, there are more 
pronounced differences between family and 
non-family firms. The family firms resort more 
to this source. This aspect can justify the higher 
level of total debt in family firms as they resort 
more to financing by the owners. In both types 
of firms, a reduction in the use of owners' 
funding is found in the second generation. The 
first generation shows greater use of finance 
from equipment suppliers (including leasing) in 
family firms. This source can be relevant for 
meeting firms' funding needs (and in the 
specific case of family ones) as a function of the 
risk factor. This source allows both parties 
involved to face less exposure to financial risk 
than that felt in the case of other sources (for 
example, bank loans). For the financing body, 
the assets underlying the contract serve as its 
collateral (guarantee). In the case of family 
firms, this external source does not increase the 
firm's financial risk (to which they are averse) in 
the same way as traditional financing, and in 
principle, does not imply presentation of more 
assets (of the firm or personal) to obtain it. In 
the second generation, less use of this source is 
found, which may be justified by the previous 
arguments associated with less need for funding. 
Table 4 does not show great differences 
between the generations of family firms 
regarding longer term zero debt. This aspect 
may have various explanations. These firms 
maintaining their aversion to debt since they 
hold on to their family character, or possible 
restrictions in accessing this source of finance. 
In non-family firms, differences are seen 
between generations. The second generation has 
a lower proportion of firms with zero medium 
and long-term debt (principally concerning bank 
debt), meaning they resort more frequently to 
debt.  
The table confirms the situation previously 
referred to of family firms showing less frequent 
use of debt but in a greater proportion when 
they do so, compared to non-family firms. This 
difference is more pronounced in financing by 
owners and equipment suppliers. In the case of 
bank debt, non-family firms present a greater 
proportion, but only in the first generation. In 
the second generation, family firms present a 
greater proportion of bank debt. This result may 
indicate a greater tendency to use this source 
(less aversion) in family firms or fewer 
Table 3 
Sources of Finance by Generation. 
  Bank T Bank LT Bank ST Owners T Owners LT Owners ST Equi. Su. T Equi. Su. LT Equi. Su. ST 
1st Generation 
Family 0,109 0,037 0,071 0,080 0,034 0,046 0,050 0,017 0,033 
No Family 0,111 0,047 0,064 0,057 0,025 0,032 0,037 0,017 0,020 
Tests                  
T test 0,64 3.60*** -2.24** -5.79*** -3.31*** -4.37*** -4.94*** 0,54 -6.83*** 
M-W -1,11 3.67*** -0,90 -7.40*** -3.44*** -2.95*** -2.09** 7.12*** -0,13 
2nd Generation 
Family 0,108 0,041 0,068 0,068 0,032 0,036 0,029 0,011 0,018 
No Family 0,120 0,048 0,072 0,043 0,020 0,023 0,029 0,014 0,015 
Tests                   
T test 1.94** 1.82** 0,96 -5.05*** -3.12*** -3.68*** -0,05 1.54* -1.72** 
M-W 2.44*** 4.21*** 2.80*** -3.77*** -4.22*** 2.03** 5.94*** 6.20*** 6.78*** 
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restrictions in long-term financing. Longer 
maturity allows better access to the financial 
market, and less creation of internal funding 
(compared to non-family firms) implies a 
greater need for external finance. 
Table 5 presents the average values 
associated with the independent variables used 
in this study considering the generation factor.  
 Table 6 presents financing sources 
considering three size categories: micro, small 
and medium-sized/large. The results show 
family firms with higher levels of debt than 
non-family firms in all sizes. This holds true for 
all debt maturities, except for long-term debt in 
micro family firms. Micro firms (both types of 
firms) form the group with less debt. Small 
firms are seen to be the group with most debt 
(principally family firms). Medium-sized/large 
firms register a fall in debt compared to small 
ones. The lower debt in micro firms may be the 
result of restrictions in accessing the financial 
market (the lower proportion of long-term debt 
may indicate this aspect) or their leaders' 
decision to keep firms at a certain size. As for 
small firms, they may still be at an early stage of 
their life-cycle, and so in a situation of greater 
growth and investment, implying a greater need 
for finance not satisfied by internally generated 
funds. Medium-sized/large firms may be 
Table 4 
Firms with Zero Medium and Long-Term Debt by Generation. 
  
Number of Firms with zero Long-term 
Debt Ratio Mean - Long-term Debt without zero 




Debt - Overall 5736 57,8% 754 50,4% 0,238 0,209 -3.79*** -5.28*** 
Bank Debt 7835 79,0% 1117 74,7% 0,177 0,187 1,17 -0,42 
Owners’ Funds 7979 80,5% 1255 83,9% 0,174 0,153 -1.72** -2.44** 
Equip. Suppliers 8285 83,5% 1121 75,0% 0,100 0,070 -4.70*** -7.36*** 
2nd Generation 
Debt - Overall 1909 57,2% 408 46,3% 0,221 0,184 -3.95*** -4.42*** 
Bank Debt 2562 76,7% 609 69,0% 0,175 0,154 -2.03*** -2.30** 
Owners’ Funds 2655 79,5% 755 85,6% 0,154 0,142 -0,72 -1,43 
Equip. Suppliers 2828 84,7% 663 75,2% 0,075 0,058 -2.24** -3.22*** 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables by Generation. 
 1st Generation 2nd Generation 
 Fam. No Fam. T Test 
Mann-
Whitney Fam. No Fam. T Test 
Mann-
Whitney 
Age 13,777 14,340 3.95*** 3.88*** 35,002 40,359 11.06*** 10.42*** 
Size 12,952 14,747 42.12*** 32.70*** 13,346 15,327 29.91*** 25.91*** 
Profitability 0,059 0,072 2.29** 5.16*** 0,038 0,052 4.23*** 3.23*** 
Tangible Assets 0,227 0,214 -2.33** -4.99*** 0,195 0,237 5.57*** 5.96*** 
Taxe Rate 0,266 0,170 -1.72** 0,29 0,274 0,250 -0,37 0,97 
R&D 0,001 0,002 2.50*** 9.00*** 0,001 0,001 2.23** 6.81*** 
NDTS 0,391 0,733 1,28 -4.51*** -7,618 0,634 0,49 2.84*** 
Liquidity 0,174 0,117 -10.01*** -13.53*** 0,178 0,107 -8.92*** -11.78*** 
Growth 0,094 0,121 2.70*** 3.74*** 0,055 0,060 0,56 1,08 
Working Capital 0,240 0,214 -3,41*** -3,24*** 0,298 0,241 -5,70*** -5,53*** 
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associated with a more mature stage of their life, 
or business, cycle, with less pronounced growth 
and investment, together with a longer past of 
accumulating funds and less need to resort to 
debt. 
Table 7 allows assessment of the weight of 
the different sources. We see a positive 
relationship between size and use of bank debt 
and credit from equipment suppliers (more 
pronounced in the case of family firms). On the 
other hand, a negative relationship is found 
between size and owners’ funding (here too 
with a greater range of variation in family 
firms). These results can be determined by the 
ownership and size factors. Increased size can 
promote access to the financial market. The 
literature gives various reasons for small firms' 
more restricted access to the financial market. 
Family firms are more averse to debt due to the 
increased financial risk, loss of control and 
greater exposure to third parties this represents. 
Larger size allows better access to the financial 
Table 6 
Sources of Finance by Size. 
 Mean 
 Family No Family 
T Test Mann-Whitney 
Micro 
Total Debt 0,500 0,461 3.84*** 3.77*** 
Long-term Debt 0,081 0,085 -0,67 0,11 
Short-term Debt 0,419 0,376 4.45*** 4.43*** 
Small 
Total Debt 0,570 0,508 8.29*** 7.80*** 
Long-term Debt 0,106 0,089 3.34*** 4.43*** 
Short-term Debt 0,465 0,419 6.20*** 5.94*** 
Medium / Large 
Total Debt 0,551 0,494 5.76*** 5.76*** 
Long-term Debt 0,113 0,108 0,92 3.28*** 
Short-term Debt 0,437 0,386 5.67*** 6.11*** 
 
Table 7 
Sources of Finance by Size. 












Family 0,085 0,027 0,058 0,094 0,038 0,055 0,041 0,011 0,029 
No Family 0,091 0,034 0,057 0,078 0,039 0,039 0,030 0,012 0,018 
Tests                   
T t est 0,87 1.76** -0,31 -2.33*** 0,13 -3.01*** -2.93*** 0,04 -3.65*** 
M-W -1,17 0,52 -1,83 -2.00** 0,26 -1.65* -4.02*** 0,01 -3.65*** 
Small 
Family 0,142 0,054 0,088 0,053 0,027 0,026 0,051 0,020 0,030 
No Family 0,120 0,051 0,070 0,039 0,015 0,025 0,035 0,017 0,019 
Tests                   
T test -3.70*** -0,70 -4,15*** -3.58*** -4.25*** -0,51 -5.05*** -1.77** -5.29*** 
M-W -5.48*** -1.80* -4.58*** -7.56*** -5.79*** -2.53** -6.22*** 0,48 -3.78*** 
Medium / Larges 
Family 0,180 0,072 0,109 0,017 0,010 0,007 0,055 0,029 0,025 
No Family 0,125 0,053 0,071 0,046 0,021 0,026 0,036 0,019 0,017 
Tests                   
T test -7.01*** -3.35*** -6.40*** 6.38*** 3.23*** 6.04*** -4.40*** -3.02*** -4.17*** 
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market and, in the case of family firms, may 
reflect a more advanced stage in their life-cycle 
and their owners' greater tendency to resort to 
these sources. The results show a lower level of 
finance obtained through financial institutions 
being compensated for by resorting to owners’ 
funding. And over the growth cycle, an 
exchange is found between the level of owners’ 
funding and bank finance. 
In larger firms there are more pronounced 
differences in the use of different sources of 
finance between family and non-family firms. 
The former tend to use more bank finance than 
the latter. As for owner funding, there is a slight 
increase in use among larger non-family firms. 
In the case of family firms, a significant fall is 
recorded between the two size categories.  
Table 8 allows assessment of firms with zero 
long-term debt for each size category. Here, 
there is a negative relationship between size and 
the frequency of zero debt firms. Family firms 
tend to present a lower frequency of zero debt 
firms than non-family ones, except for micro 
firms which show similarity between the two 
types of firm. This group seems to show greater 
restrictions (or needs) regarding finance of 
longer maturity as a greater frequency of the 
zero ratio is found in the different sources 
analyzed. Indeed, the results indicate a positive 
relationship between size and the number of 
firms using long-term finance from financial 
institutions (bank credit and equipment 
suppliers). This relationship is more pronounced 
in the case of family firms. In relation to long-
term finance from owners, there is a slightly 
greater frequency of use in small family firms, 
but around 4/5 of firms in the sample do not 
resort to this source. Analysis of the average 
values of the weight of debt, in firms without 
zero ratios in each source, shows an influence of 
zero values characterizing the financial structure 
of sample firms. For example, similarly to the 
results obtained by Ramalho and Silva (2009), 
small firms present a greater frequency of zero 
values, but show a greater proportion of long-
term debt (when they use it), i.e., a negative 
relationship between size and the proportion of 
debt is found when, previously, there was a 
positive relationship in its use. This is common 
to both types of firm. However, when analyzing 
the proportion of each source, in the case of 
micro and medium-sized/large non-family 
firms, we observe a similarity between bank 
debt and owners’ funding (although the former 
show a higher proportion of these sources). In 
the case of family firms, we see the importance 
of owners’ funding in financing small firms. 
Increased size leads to a substitution (in 
proportion) of this source by bank credit.  
Table 8 
Firms with Zero Medium and Long-Term Debt by Size. 
  
Number of Firms with zero Long-term 
Debt Ratio Mean - Long-term Debt without zero 




Debt - Overall 5488 65,9% 394 65,2% 0,259 0,264 0,35 -0,42 
Bank Debt 7117 85,4% 512 84,8% 0,188 0,224 2.10** 0,93 
Owners’ Funds 6793 81,5% 489 81,0% 0,207 0,204 -0,17 -0,74 
Equip. Suppliers 7522 90,3% 545 90,2% 0,118 0,118 0,02 -0,41 
Small 
Debt - Overall 1952 46,3% 443 50,1% 0,214 0,196 -1.99** -3.15*** 
Bank Debt 2925 69,4% 643 72,7% 0,175 0,185 1,02 0,48 
Owners’ Funds 3259 77,3% 760 85,9% 0,120 0,104 -1,23 -1,49 
Equip. Suppliers 3176 75,3% 650 73,4% 0,083 0,062 -2.97*** -4.05*** 
Medium / Large 
Debt - Overall 205 29,0% 325 36,6% 0,174 0,177 0,36 -1,25 
Bank Debt 355 50,1% 571 64,3% 0,144 0,149 0,57 -0,83 
Owners’ Funds 582 82,2% 761 85,7% 0,056 0,144 5.42*** 4.38*** 
Equip. Suppliers 415 58,6% 589 66,3% 0,070 0,057 -1.72** -4.07*** 
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In larger firms there are more pronounced 
differences in the use of different sources of 
finance between family and non-family firms. 
The former tend to use more bank finance than 
the latter. As for owner funding, there is a slight 
increase in use among larger non-family firms. 
In the case of family firms, a significant fall is 
recorded between the two size categories.  
Table 8 allows assessment of firms with zero 
long-term debt for each size category. Here, 
there is a negative relationship between size and 
the frequency of zero debt firms. Family firms 
tend to present a lower frequency of zero debt 
firms than non-family ones, except for micro 
firms which show similarity between the two 
types of firm. This group seems to show greater 
restrictions (or needs) regarding finance of 
longer maturity as a greater frequency of the 
zero ratio is found in the different sources 
analyzed. Indeed, the results indicate a positive 
relationship between size and the number of 
firms using long-term finance from financial 
institutions (bank credit and equipment 
suppliers). This relationship is more pronounced 
in the case of family firms. In relation to long-
term finance from owners, there is a slightly 
greater frequency of use in small family firms, 
but around 4/5 of firms in the sample do not 
resort to this source. Analysis of the average 
values of the weight of debt, in firms without 
zero ratios in each source, shows an influence of 
zero values characterizing the financial structure 
of sample firms. For example, similarly to the 
results obtained by Ramalho and Silva (2009), 
small firms present a greater frequency of zero 
values, but show a greater proportion of long-
term debt (when they use it), i.e., a negative 
relationship between size and the proportion of 
debt is found when, previously, there was a 
positive relationship in its use. This is common 
to both types of firm. However, when analyzing 
the proportion of each source, in the case of 
micro and medium-sized/large non-family 
firms, we observe a similarity between bank 
debt and owners’ funding (although the former 
show a higher proportion of these sources). In 
the case of family firms, we see the importance 
of owners’ funding in financing small firms. 
Increased size leads to a substitution (in 
proportion) of this source by bank credit.  
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics of 
the three categories and two types of firms. 
 
5. Estimation of Models 
This section presents the results obtained 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables by Size. 
 Micro Small Medium / Large 




T test Mann-Whitney Fam. No Fam. 
T test Mann-Whitney Fam. No Fam. 
T test Mann-Whitney 
Age 17,601 19,803 4.62*** 2.80*** 20,899 22,563 3.60*** 1.91* 26,486 28,274 2.10** -0,15 
Size 12,304 12,502 4.00*** 4.30*** 14,084 14,826 20.24*** 19.04*** 15,692 16,772 17.24*** 16.70*** 
Profitability 0,051 0,032 -2.18** -2.33** 0,057 0,076 5.95*** 3.35*** 0,062 0,075 3.08*** 2.08** 
Tang. 
Assets 0,204 0,203 -0,07 -2.76*** 0,240 0,215 -3.42*** -6.33*** 0,279 0,242 -3.71*** -5.55*** 
Taxe Rate 0,248 0,226 -0,26 -2.42** 0,300 0,267 -0,61 -1.87* 0,308 0,114 -1.30* -1,45 
R&D 0,001 0,001 0,54 1,12 0,001 0,002 1.94** 0,83 0,001 0,002 0,96 0,57 
NDTS -2,858 1,378 0,33 -4.23*** 0,399 0,420 0,09 -6.98*** 0,800 0,509 -0,77 -3.40*** 
Liquidity 0,212 0,186 
-
2.59*** -4.36*** 0,118 0,103 -2.82*** -5.45*** 0,081 0,075 -1,12 -3.65*** 
Growth 0,074 0,069 -0,32 -0,52 0,100 0,100 0,01 -0,07 0,105 0,115 0,59 -1,23 
Work. 
Capital 0,247 0,207 
-
3.23*** -3.37*** 0,272 0,243 -3.15*** -3.25*** 0,249 0,217 -2.82*** -2.93*** 
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with the econometric models and the respective 
analysis.  
 
5.1. Factors Determining the Use and 
Proportion of Debt and the Generation Issue 
This section aims to ascertain the impact of 
generations in the two-part econometric models, 
i.e., how the generation variable influences the 
determinants of use and proportion of debt. 
Therefore, reference will only be made to the 
differences introduced by this factor in the 
results of the econometric models estimated in 
the previous section. The age variable shows a 
reduction in the proportion of debt with 
increased age, as seen in the descriptive 
analysis. In the case of family firms, this 
variable is not significant for use of debt but is 
so in determining its proportion, presenting 
different signs between the two generations. The 
negative relationship in the first generation may 
mean that, at an initial stage of their life-cycle, 
firms' leaders seek a greater proportion of debt, 
but increased business maturity means a lower 
proportion of that debt (due to accumulation of 
internal funds). Indeed, the descriptive analysis 
showed a lower proportion of debt in the second 
generation than in the first. The first generation 
may have a greater aversion to debt but at an 
initial stage of business start-up they may feel a 
need to resort to it (since there are various 
sources which are not exclusively financial, for 
example, funding through the owners 
themselves). The positive relationship in the 
second generation means a greater tendency in 
these firms to use a greater proportion of debt as 
age increases. This result indicates a greater 
tendency towards debt in the third generation 
than in the second generation, contradicting the 
results obtained by Sonfield and Lussier (2004), 
Coleman and Carsky (1999) and Cole and 
Wolken (1995). These authors observed a more 
moderate level of debt in the third generation 
than in the second.  
In the case of the size variable, there is a 
significant and positive relationship with the 
Table 10 
Two-Part Fractional Regression Model – Generation and Long-term Debt. 
1st Generation 2nd Generation 
Family No Family Family No Family   
Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II 
Age 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
  -0,82 -1.93* -0,27 -2.91*** 0,30 1.92* -0,16 -2.22** 
Size 0,34 -0,08 0,20 -0,02 0,27 -0,07 0,20 -0,01 
  18.61*** -12.05*** 6.36*** -2.02** 9.79*** -6.73*** 4.48*** -0,93 
Profitability -1,13 -0,89 -0,76 -0,85 -1,19 -0,89 -2,16 -1,08 
  -4.62*** -7.29*** -1,51 -3.42*** -2.31** -3.50*** -2.38** -3.39*** 
Tangible 1,38 0,64 2,34 0,60 1,26 0,52 3,30 0,22 
  10.85*** 11.42*** 7.51*** 4.95*** 4.94*** 5.20*** 6.93*** 1,32 
Tax rate 0,02 0,02 0,23 -0,03 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,03 
  0,70 1,41 1.76* -1,37 -0,73 -0,20 -0,23 -1,04 
R&D 2,35 0,48 -1,08 -0,38 -1,61 -1,66 -2,75 -5,71 
  1,36 1,34 -0,22 -0,17 -0,27 -0,74 -0,32 -2.75*** 
NDTS 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 
  0,55 0,23 1,59 0,42 0,99 2.55** 0,55 -0,82 
Liquidity -1,30 0,02 -1,13 -0,32 -2,44 -0,13 -1,30 -0,19 
  -8.66*** 0,27 -2.64*** -1.76* -8.26*** -0,92 -2.15** -0,77 
Growth 0,21 0,10 0,09 0,07 0,49 0,14 0,83 0,25 
  3.11*** 3.45*** 0,92 0,88 2.40** 1.82* 1.95* 1.97** 
Work capital 0,48 0,42 0,23 0,07 0,07 0,29 0,57 -0,10 
  4.59*** 7.41*** 0,91 0,62 0,35 3.42*** 1,53 -0,60 
Constant -5,16 0,69 -4,07 0,35 -4,19 0,13 -3,37 -0,20 
  -18.51*** 6.04*** -6.89*** 1,45 -7.73*** 0,74 -4.20*** -0,72 
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issue of long-term debt through external bodies 
in all types of firms. In determining the 
proportion of debt, a negative and statistically 
significant relationship is found. These results 
confirm that large firms use more long-term 
debt but small firms do so in a greater 
proportion when they manage to gain access. 
Small firms face more restrictions in accessing 
the financial market and so present a lower 
frequency of using debt, but when they gain 
access they use a greater proportion than large 
firms. However, this behaviour can also be 
explained by the fact of small firms facing 
higher transaction costs when using external 
sources of finance, and therefore they resort to 
them less frequently but for larger amounts to 
compensate for that lower frequency (Ramalho 
and Silva, 2009). The results obtained with the 
profitability variable clearly confirm the aspect 
of the theory of pecking order where self-
financing emerges as the main source. This 
variable presents a negative, statistically 
significant relationship with the use of debt and 
determination of its proportion. Increased 
profitability means more internal funds and less 
need to turn to debt. This aspect is common to 
family and non-family firms. Tangible assets 
influence significantly and positively the 
decision to use debt and its proportion in both 
family and non-family firms, due to their 
collateral value. Firms with greater amounts of 
this type of asset have greater access to the 
financial market and a greater proportion of 
debt. This relationship also proves the suitability 
of the maturity of applications to the funds they 
finance. 
In the model of the first generation of non-
family firms, the result of the tax rate confirms 
the hypothesis of the relationship between tax 
rate and debt, presenting a positive and 
significant relationship. This factor is not 
relevant for family firms in determining the use 
and proportion of debt. The hypothesis 
associated with R&D investment is confirmed 
in the second part of the model of second 
generation non-family firms (the only model 
showing this variable as significant). This aspect 
may result from this type of investment being 
possibly more relevant in non-family firms of 
some maturity. Nevertheless, given the risk of 
this type of asset, these firms tend to have a 
lower proportion of debt. 
The NDTS variable is only significant in the 
second part of the second generation family firm 
model but with an opposite sign to the one 
expected, reflecting the aspects previously 
mentioned. The growth rate variable is clearly 
significant in determining the use and 
proportion of debt in family firms. Growth 
implies a greater need to use external finance 
more frequently and in greater proportions. In 
the case of non-family firms, it is only relevant 
for determining a greater proportion of debt. 
The liquidity variable presents a negative and 
significant relationship with the use of debt 
confirming that greater liquidity means less 
need to use debt. This variable is only 
significant in determining the proportion of debt 
in non-family firms but maintains the sign of the 
relationship. In the case of family firms, the 
non-significant relationship can be explained by 
their tendency to maintain high liquidity, even 
revealing higher levels of debt. The working 
capital needs variable is only significant for 
family firms. A greater volume of these needs 
means a greater need of external funding. In this 
relationship, it is relevant that the sign reflects 
the assumptions pointed out in the financial 
literature on how working capital needs should 
be financed. 
In analyzing the results obtained in the 
following econometric models, it was decided to 
refer to the relevant differences or aspects 
compared to the results obtained in the first 
models. The results of the econometric models 
relating to the influence of generation on bank 
debt confirm less use of this source of finance in 
second generation firms. Increased age leads to 
less use of bank debt. In the case of family 
firms, this result confirms the observations of 
the descriptive analysis where an increase of 
second generation firms with zero debt was 
found. The second non-family generation 
recorded a reduced number of firms with zero 
debt between the first and second generation. 
Increased size leads to greater use of this source 
(both types of firms) and in a greater proportion 
(in family firms). This result confirms the 
hypothesis about the relationship between size 
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and access to the financial market. Profitability 
is not relevant in determining the proportion of 
bank debt in second generation family firms. 
This variable was not considered relevant in 
determining the use of total debt in the first 
generation of non-family firms. These results 
may be the consequence of the latter being the 
group of firms with the best performance 
(showing profitability of 7,9%) and the former 
being the group with the worst performance 
(4,1%). 
The positive relationship between R&D 
investment and the use and proportion of bank 
debt, found previously, is confirmed for both 
generations of family firms. Given the possible 
difficulty of financing this type of investment 
through financial institutions, this result may be 
relevant in explaining the level of innovation 
registered in family firms. The NDTS variable 
presents differences in the sign of the 
relationship in the second part of the models of 
family firms of the first (negative) and second 
(positive) generation. Therefore, only in the first 
case is the hypothesis confirmed. In the second, 
the relationship between this variable and 
tangible assets is reflected. Confirmation of the 
hypothesis associated with the tax rate in the 
models of bank debt occurs in first generation 
firms (family and non-family). This relationship 
may occur due to these being greater users of 
this source than second generation firms.  
 
5.2. Factors Determining the Use and 
Proportion of Debt and the Size Issue 
This section introduces the matter of size in 
determining the use and proportion of debt, 
classifying the sample of family and non-family 
firms in the three size categories previously 
referred to. The age variable is significant and 
with a negative sign in the first part of the 
models of family firms, showing that increased 
age leads to less use of debt in the three size 
categories. This only occurs in small non-family 
firms. As for determining the proportion of debt, 
significance (negative sign) is only found in the 
models of small non-family firms. These firms 
tend to use a lower proportion of debt. In the 
descriptive analysis of the sample period we 
saw this aspect confirmed by this econometric 
model, finding a reduction of debt in the three 
groups over the five-year period analyzed.  
In the case of the size variable, a significant 
and positive relationship is found with the issue 
of debt in all sizes of family firms, and a non-
significant one in non-family firms. In the 
second part of the model, this was only 
significant in small family firms and with the 
opposite sign from the one obtained in the first 
part of the model. These results mean that 
increased size leads to more use of long-term 
debt but in smaller proportions. This behaviour 
can be explained by the fact of small firms 
being more averse to debt due to the financial 
risk or being exposed to greater restrictions in 
access to finance. Besides, transaction costs are 
more significant in small firms. Therefore, when 
they gain access to finance, they seek a greater 
proportion for current and future needs. 
Increased size allows greater access and lower 
costs, and so these firms can obtain funds more 
frequently without needing to get large amounts 
each time. This variable is not significant for 
non-family firms, except for the second part of 
the model of medium-sized/large non-family 
firms where they present a positive relationship.   
The profitability and tangible assets variables 
maintain the relationships referred to throughout 
this study, confirming the respective 
hypotheses. In the latter case, there is a clear 
relationship between tangible assets and long-
term finance. The average tax rate is not 
significant in any of the models and R&D 
investment is only significant in the second part 
of the models of non-family micro and medium-
sized/large firms, confirming the hypothesis. 
The liquidity variable is confirmed as an 
important determinant of family firms' financing 
decision, mainly in determining the use of debt. 
The negative and statistically significant sign in 
the first part of all family firm models indicates 
that firms with greater liquidity need less 
external funding. However, this variable is 
irrelevant in determining the proportion. Only in 
the case of medium-sized/large non-family 
firms is it seen to be significant. Indeed, Graph 
7 illustrates that this size category presents a 
greater volume of liquidity than its family 
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counterpart. In the other two sizes, family firms 
present clearly greater liquidity than their non-
family counterparts. 
The growth rate is significant for all models 
of family firms (except for the first part of the 
model of small ones). In non-family firms, that 
significance only appears in the second part of 
the model of small ones and the first part of the 
medium-sized/large ones. So these results seem 
to show growth as a factor determining the 
decision to use debt and its proportion. And this 
variable has a more prominent role in family 
firms. These may have more need of external 
funding than their non-family counterparts due 
to less creation of internal finance. The 
relationship between working capital needs and 
long-term finance is only significant in family 
firms. And among these, micro firms show a 
positive relationship with the use and proportion 
of long-term debt. In the next sizes, only the 
relationship with the proportion is significant. 
One possible explanation is that micro firms 
hold less equity and need to resort to outside 
capital more than the other size categories. 
Table 11 presents estimation of the models 
by the different size categories for total bank 
debt. The next paragraphs will only mention the 
contribution of these models to clarifying the 
financial process compared to the previous 
models. The results associated with the age 
variable (significant and with a negative sign) in 
the first part of the models of small family firms 
indicate less use of bank debt with increased 
age. This behaviour may be due to small family 
firms' aversion to financial debt. In these, the 
arguments about family firms are more likely to 
apply since at this size there may be more 
concentration of management and decisions in 
the family or a single family member. 
Nevertheless, the arguments about the existence 
of internally generated funds and the restrictions 
faced by these firms may also be valid. The 
descriptive analysis showed large family firms 
to be greater users (in terms of the frequency of 
Table 11 
Two-Part Fractional Regression Model – Generation and Bank Debt. 
1st Generation 2nd Generation 
Family No Family Family No Family 
  Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II 
Age 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 
  0,26 -0,75 1,51 -0,30 -3.33*** -0,49 -1.69* -0,95 
Size 0,50 0,04 0,10 0,01 0,41 0,06 0,10 0,01 
  24.84*** 7.50*** 3.27*** 1,26 13.44*** 6.86*** 2.09** 0,90 
Profitability -1,75 -0,58 -2,00 -0,59 -1,40 -0,06 -3,97 -0,80 
  -6.80*** -6.53*** -3.70*** -2.59*** -2.64*** -0,33 -3.95*** -2.79*** 
Tangible 0,68 0,40 1,44 0,41 0,89 0,30 1,40 0,04 
  5.17*** 10.21*** 4.60*** 4.07*** 3.31*** 3.83*** 2.97*** 0,30 
Tax rate 0,06 0,01 0,20 -0,01 0,05 0,00 0,29 0,02 
  1.86* 0,86 1.73* -0,57 1,02 1,06 1,55 0,81 
R&D 12,25 0,96 -1,11 0,22 53,16 3,14 12,80 -0,17 
  2.21** 3.09*** -0,23 0,13 2.27** 4.27*** 0,91 -0,12 
NDTS 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 
  0,82 -3.75*** -0,91 1.68* 1,43 2.17** 0,89 -1,45 
Liquidity -2,42 0,08 -3,92 -0,09 -4,04 -0,13 -6,49 -0,70 
  -15.75*** 1,61 -7.95*** -0,47 -12.84*** -1,26 -7.74*** -2.53** 
Growth 0,23 0,16 0,12 0,10 0,80 0,20 0,84 0,23 
  3.14*** 6.66*** 1,25 1,32 3.53*** 2.99*** 1.89* 1,53 
Work capital 0,43 0,54 0,64 0,48 0,12 0,44 0,70 0,33 
  3.99*** 16.33*** 2.46** 5.53*** 0,60 7.24*** 1.77* 2.94*** 
Constant -5,78 -1,15 -1,63 -0,76 -4,38 -1,22 -1,09 -0,87 
  -19.64*** -13.32*** -2.80*** -3.95*** -7.48*** -7.54*** -1,32 -3.59*** 
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the number of firms using it) of this source than 
their non-family counterparts. 
In this source of finance, a positive (and 
statistically significant) relationship is observed 
between size and use in all size categories of 
family firms and in small non-family firms. 
That is to say, increased size increases the use 
of bank debt, as was demonstrated in the 
descriptive analysis. The results associated with 
the age and size variable may show two types of 
family firm behaviour within each of the smaller 
size categories. A set of firms that increase the 
use of bank debt as their size increases 
(increased size meaning greater growth and 
greater needs, and simultaneously greater access 
to the financial market). And another set of 
firms, more averse to financial debt, that use 
their life-cycle and funds generated so far by the 
business, and use less bank debt as their age 
increases. For example, one reason will be 
having reached a certain size and chosen to limit 
growth to internally generated funds. However, 
the second part of the small, family firm models 
also reveals a positive and significant sign for 
this relationship. The previous models showed a 
negative relationship with the proportion of 
debt. Therefore, these results mean for these 
firms an exchange of sources of finance in 
family firms as size increases, for example, 
increasingly less use of owners’ funding and 
greater use of bank debt, as observed in the 
descriptive analysis.  
Table 12 
Two-part Fractional Regression Model – Size and Long-term Debt. 
  Micro Small Medium / Large 
 Family No Family Family No Family Family No Family 
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The average tax rate is of some relevance in 
determining the financing decision of large 
family firms, confirming the hypothesis. The 
results confirm the importance of bank finance 
for funding R&D activities in small family firms 
when the financial literature refers to a negative 
relationship between this type of investment and 
debt. 
Growth has a relevant role in determining the 
use and proportion of bank debt in small family 
firms. This significance only occurs in the 
models of large non-family firms. Bank finance 
is therefore observed as a source of reference 
for the growth of micro and small family firms. 
 
6. Discussion of the Hypotheses and 
Conclusions 
This section goes on to make a critical 
analysis of the results and their relationship with 
the hypotheses tested. The first hypothesis (H1) 
consisted of testing for differences or 
similarities in the financial structure decision, 
and specifically in capital structure, between 
family and non-family firms. The results 
showed greater debt in the former (statistically 
significant). The maturity of debt is a relevant 
factor in the financing process of both types of 
firm. Family firms present higher levels of 
short-term debt and lower levels of long-term 
debt. Accordingly, the results of this study 
confirm the arguments of the approach in the 
financial literature that defends greater debt in 
family firms. In addition, financial structures 
seem to show family firms' greater restrictions 
in accessing long-term debt. However, the 
sample reveals the smaller size of family firms 
and this factor may determine the results 
obtained.  
Table 13 
Two-part Fractional Regression Model- Size and Bank Debt. 
  Micro Small Medium / Large 
 Family No Family Family No Family Family No Family 
 Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II Part 1 Part II 
Age -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
  -5.41*** -0,60 -0,81 -0,74 -4.12*** -0,60 -1,12 -0,58 -1,41 0,77 -0,03 -0,54 
Size 0,50 0,05 0,15 0,04 0,41 0,06 0,16 0,02 0,25 -0,01 -0,02 0,02 
  19.68*** 5.64*** 1.95* 1,51 9.01*** 6.04*** 1.85* 0,97 2.02** -0,64 -0,27 1,01 
Profitability -1,16 -0,30 -1,43 0,01 -2,84 -0,71 -3,10 -0,79 -3,97 -0,97 -3,22 -1,06 
  -4.49*** -2.87*** -1.70* 0,03 -5.56*** -5.51*** -3.80*** -2.94*** -2.79*** -4.50*** -3.81*** -3.54*** 
Tangible 0,52 0,34 0,78 0,26 1,20 0,48 2,01 0,36 1,71 0,38 1,83 0,39 
  3.80*** 6.97**** 1.75* 1,53 4.75*** 8.47*** 4.35*** 2.94*** 2.23** 3.08*** 3.78*** 2.83*** 
Tax rate 0,04 0,00 0,33 0,08 0,08 0,02 0,19 -0,01 0,21 0,02 0,18 0,00 
  1,57 0,22 1,17 1,58 1,06 1.78* 1,23 -0,66 1.73* 1,46 1,40 0,06 
R&D 12,01 0,99 -7,67 2,01 30,85 1,43 -2,17 -0,56 14,02 -0,44 26,60 0,11 
  1.94* 3.24*** -0,83 0,32 1.91* 1,23 -0,31 -0,26 0,43 -0,16 1,63 0,09 
NDTS 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,06 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 
  0,95 -0,73 0,96 4.44*** 1,12 0,23 -0,42 -0,80 -1,39 -0,28 -0,32 -0,18 
Liquidity -2,42 0,04 -4,02 -0,11 -3,74 0,00 -5,25 -0,21 -8,43 -0,81 -5,24 -0,56 
  -15.86*** 0,71 -6.46*** -0,41 -11.96*** 0,03 -6.90*** -0,77 -7.30*** -3.00*** -5.87*** -1.95* 
Growth 0,17 0,17 0,09 0,23 0,57 0,17 0,05 0,01 0,71 0,17 1,40 0,21 
  2.10** 5.76*** 0,51 1,13 3.62*** 4.44*** 0,46 0,10 1,32 2.10** 3.28*** 1.65* 
Work capital 0,30 0,42 -0,09 0,21 0,52 0,68 0,92 0,44 0,79 0,53 1,10 0,64 
  2.69*** 11.12*** -0,24 1,43 2.66*** 14.02*** 2.54** 4.22*** 1,30 5.29*** 2.73*** 5.53*** 
Constant -5,51 -1,27 -0,95 -0,88 -4,59 -1,48 -2,14 -0,84 0,32 -0,29 0,39 -0,69 
  -15.73*** -10.45*** -0,87 -1.94* -6.92*** -9.14*** -1,63 -2.33** 0,13 -0,87 0,34 -2.05** 
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Regarding the maturity of debt, in the firm 
sample a significant number of zeros is found in 
financing sources of long maturity (principally 
in family firms for total and bank debt). This 
result may indicate these firms' possible 
restrictions in accessing debt with longer 
maturity. 
In the formation of the two types of firms' 
capital structure, differences were observed 
between the levels of financing sources used. 
Bank credit is the main source. Non-family 
firms presented slightly higher levels of this 
source (more evident in long maturity since 
family firms showed higher levels of short-term 
debt). The two other relevant sources were 
credit from owners and equipment suppliers. 
Family firms presented higher levels of both 
these sources, revealing their importance for this 
type of firm. The results indicate family firms' 
preference for this source due to greater 
aversion to financial debt or possible restrictions 
in accessing bank finance. 
The financial literature points to less aversion 
to debt in second generation family firms (H2). 
Therefore, those firms would be expected to 
present more debt in their financial structures. 
Nevertheless, the results show the opposite. 
Second generation firms of both types reveal 
lower levels of debt. However, family firms 
continue to show greater debt (despite the 
statistical relevance not being as obvious as in 
the case of the first generation resulting from 
the approximation between the two types of 
firms, as mentioned above). This lower debt in 
second generation firms resulted from a greater 
accumulation of results and increased share 
capital. Among the three most relevant 
financing sources, less use of credit from 
owners and equipment suppliers is found in 
second generation firms and constant or slightly 
increased levels of bank debt. However, an 
increase of zero values of bank debt is observed 
in second generation family firms when the 
same generation of non-family firms register a 
decrease. 
The size factor (H3) is seen to be an 
important determinant of firms' financial 
structure. Micro firms present lower levels of 
debt (of both maturities) than small and 
medium-sized/large ones. Small firms present 
the highest levels of debt, essentially short-term. 
Medium-sized/large firms are the group with the 
highest levels of long-term debt. In this 
maturity, some similarity is observed between 
family and non-family micro firms and between 
family and non-family medium-sized/large 
firms. In terms of evolution, micro firms present 
an increase in equity and a reduction of total 
debt which is more pronounced than in the other 
two sizes. There is a negative relationship 
between size and the scale of this evolution.  
Larger family firms show a lower frequency 
of long-term zero debt than their non-family 
counterparts and a negative relationship 
between size and zero debt, but in the case of 
micro firms this is inverted. Zero values are 
relevant in both size categories (principally in 
small firms). These results hold true in the 
specific situation of total bank debt. Around 
50% of micro firms do not resort to this source. 
Small and medium-sized/large firms present a 
weight of 28% and 18% of firms in this 
situation. The models revealed some differences 
between the factors determining the use of long-
term debt compared to those determining its 
proportion, and between family and non-family 
firms (H4).  
The greater debt in family firms than in non-
family ones corroborates the financial line of 
thought which defends this behaviour. But this 
only occurs with total and short-term debt. With 
long-term debt, the situation is inverted, which 
may reveal these firms face some restrictions in 
accessing debt of a longer maturity. This fact 
can also be explained by banking institutions' 
preference for granting more short-term debt to 
reduce problems of information asymmetry, 
because it means the debt must be renegotiated 
more frequently. Family firms show greater use 
of debt from owners and equipment suppliers, 
particularly in the first generation. The results 
do not allow confirmation of whether this 
behaviour is due to greater restrictions in 
accessing debt or the option of family firm 
leaders given their aversion to debt. The second 
generation shows lower levels of debt than the 
first. Nevertheless, between the generations in 
both types of firms (family and non-family), the 
same differences mentioned previously are 
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observed. The high failure rate of family firms 
may justify this lower debt in the second 
generation (when the literature indicates they 
are less averse to debt) since only the most 
conservative firms remain in the market, or it 
may be associated with a more mature stage of 
their life-cycle and less need to invest. 
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